Introduction
In many real-life situations, managers turn to multiple advisors before making their
decisions. Yet, we know from research on decision-making and risk communication that the way advisors communicate their forecasts affects decision-makers' (DMs) beliefs and decisions. Ambiguity research for instance shows that the degree of precision of a probabilistic message has an impact on decision-makers' choices (Camerer and Weber, 1992; Chow and Sarin, 2002; Ellsberg, 1961; Ho et al., 2002 Ho et al., , 2005 Roca et al., 2006) . Other research shows that the degree of agreement among advisors influences DMs belief and confidence (Budescu et al., 2003 , Cameron 2005 , Chesson and Viscusi, 2003 Dean and Shepherd, 2007; Einhorn and Hogarth, 1985; Kunreuther et al. 1995; Viscusi and Chesson, 2 1999 ) and can even generate irrational behaviors (Viscusi, 1997) . Smithson (1999) for instance demonstrates that DMs react differently to a conflicting message and to a consensual but imprecise message. He explains that DMs do not like conflict because it raises a doubt about whether the advisors are credible and trustworthy (see also Cabantous, 2007) .
These studies have two main implications. First, they suggest studying the impact of the source of uncertainty (Heath and Tversky, 1991) on choices and beliefs (Fox and Tversky, 1998; Kilka and Weber, 2001 ). Second, they point to the existence of a potential trade-off between various sources of uncertainty. For instance in some situations, an imprecise message can be a way to reach a consensus among advisors who do not agree on a precise estimate. Third, they invite studying the aggregation rule DMs use in such a way that we can learn how belief and confidence interplay to support their choices.
The purpose of the present paper is to investigate the effects of various sources of uncertainty on DMs' beliefs. We study decision contexts where DMs turn to advisors for probability forecasts and we focus on two sources of uncertainty: conflict -called S c for
Conflicting Source -and imprecision -called S i for Imprecise Source. In the first case, DMs are uncertain because their advisors disagree on the probability of the same event. In the second case, DMs are uncertain because their advisors are imprecise and communicate the same imprecise probability forecast. We seek to provide answers to the following two research questions. 1) How do conflicting probabilistic estimates and, consensual but imprecise probabilistic estimates affect DMs' beliefs and choices? 2) Which belief do DMs base their decision on when they receive such forecasts? In other words, how do they combine their belief and the confidence they have in it when basing their decisions on these forecasts?
To study the impacts of S i and S c on choices and beliefs, we build on the literature on sources of uncertainty (Tverky and Fox, 1995) and the revealed-preference approach characteristic of the economic literature (see Alchian, 1953; Wakker, 2004) . We implement a 'choice-based approach' of belief (Abdellaoui et al. 2005 ) that consists in inferring beliefs from observed choices. We call the elicited beliefs "revealed beliefs". These beliefs differ from judged probabilities commonly elicited in experiments on judgments and decisions under uncertainty (Fox and Tversky, 1998) .
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 introduces the concept of revealed belief and the two sources of uncertainty we study. Section 2 presents the elicitation technique used.
Sections 3 and 4 present the hypotheses and the results of two experiments. Section 5 discusses the results and their implications and concludes.
Beliefs and their properties

Revealed vs judged beliefs
Throughout, we call revealed belief of an uncertain decision context the precise probability that would lead to the same choice in an 'equivalent' risky decision context 1 . Imagine a DM who would be indifferent between a loss of !y if an uncertain situation occurs and a sure loss of !x and; who would also be indifferent between a !y loss with a known probability p and a sure loss of !x. In that example, the revealed belief of the uncertain situation is p. Revealed beliefs therefore differ from judged beliefs -a term we introduce to refer to judged probabilities that DMs report as their best estimate of the probability of the target event. The major difference is that revealed beliefs are not reported by DMs but are inferred from choices. Throughout the paper, we assume that there exists a unique revealed/judged belief for each given uncertain situation. This means that we assume that revealed/judged beliefs are not influenced by outcomes.
Several studies have suggested that judged beliefs are unlikely to capture DMs' confidence in their knowledge (Fox and Tversky, 1998; Kilka and Weber, 2001 ). Yet uncertainty is likely to affect DMs' confidence in their beliefs (Budescu and Yu, 2006, 2007) . This decreases the predictive power of studies based on judged beliefs (Fox and Tversky, 1998) .
Revealed belief, on the other hand, should allow capturing the full impact of the sources of uncertainty (Wakker, 2004) . If DMs' confidence in their knowledge materializes by a "penalty" or a "bonus" applied to one source of uncertainty when making a choice, revealed beliefs will capture it as they are directly inferred from choices. Hence studying revealed beliefs -and comparing them to judged beliefs -can further our knowledge of how belief and confidence interplay in supporting choices made under uncertainty. The following subsections formally introduce the decision contexts, and some properties of revealed beliefs.
Our three decision contexts
For simplicity of presentation, we restrict the present study to the loss domain. The objects of choice are binary prospects on the outcome set R " (non-mixed negative binary prospects).
We assume that a binary preference relation represents DMs' preferences on prospects.
4 First, we use risk -a consensual decision context where DMs receive precise probabilitiesas a benchmark. Risky prospects, x p y, yields the outcome x with probability p and the outcome y (with 0#y#x) with probability (1"p).
When DMs receive a unique but imprecise probabilistic estimate from their advisors, such as a range of probabilities, we consider that uncertainty comes from imprecision. We refer to this situation as S i , for imprecise (source of) uncertainty. Formally, we define S i as S i = {[p"r,p+r]: r $ p $ 1"r}.
The third situation, the DM receives two precise but different probability estimates. We call this decision context S c , for conflicting (source of) uncertainty. Formally, we define S c as S c = {{p"r,p+r}: r $ p $ 1"r}.
We denote x [p"r,p+r] y a S i prospect and x {p"r,p+r} y a S c prospect. They give x with probability that belongs to [p"r,p+r] or to {p"r,p+r} respectively and y (with 0#y#x) otherwise.
Throughout, r will be assumed constant and strictly positive.
Formal properties of beliefs
Building on the literature on decision-making under uncertainty (Tversky and Wakker, 1995) , we equip revealed beliefs with two properties. The first property relates to the relative elevation of the beliefs with respect to the midpoints p of the corresponding [p"r,p+r] or {p"r,p+r}. We say that revealed beliefs exhibit pessimism if they are strictly higher than the midpoints. Such revealed beliefs suggest that the DM is attracted towards the upper estimations (p+r) of the probability that the worst consequence happens. Hence, in the loss domain, the higher the revealed belief, the more pessimistic the DM is. Optimism is defined as the opposite of pessimism.
The second property captures revealed beliefs' reactions to changes in likelihood. We say that revealed beliefs exhibit low likelihood sensitivity if they vary less than the midpoints of the corresponding source. For instance, S i revealed beliefs are weakly sensitive to a change in likelihood if the revealed belief of [p"r,p+r] is q and that of [p"r+%,p+r+%] is q+& with %>&.
Moreover, if the revealed beliefs of {p"r,p+r} and {p"r+%,p+r+%} are q' and q'+&', revealed beliefs exhibit less likelihood sensitivity in S i than in S c if &<&'. Reversing the appropriate inequalities allow defining high(er) likelihood sensitivity.
These two properties -pessimism and likelihood sensitivity-also apply to judged beliefs.
We can therefore compare beliefs both across sources of uncertainty (S i vs. S c ) and across elicitation methods (judged vs. revealed beliefs). For instance, the revealed belief assigned to beliefs do not exhibit pessimism because they are equal to the midpoints. They do not exhibit likelihood insensitivity either because they increase as much as the midpoints. In Figure 1b , beliefs are pessimistic (in the loss domain) because they are higher than the midpoints.
Furthermore because they increase as much as the midpoints, they do not exhibit likelihood insensitivity. On the contrary, Figure 1c ' beliefs increase less than the corresponding midpoints. They exhibit likelihood insensitivity. In addition, in this figure, they are there are as many pessimistic beliefs as there are optimistic beliefs. Figure 1d combines likelihood insensitivity ( Figure 1c ) and pessimism ( Figure 1b) . However, unlike in Figure 1c , a majority of beliefs is higher than the midpoint.
Elicitation technique
In this research, we use a model of choice under uncertainty, Prospect Theory (PT) (Tversky and Kahneman 3 , 1992) , to derive the revealed beliefs (see also Budescu et al., 2002) . We initially planned to directly elicited the probability q such that xqy~x {p"r,p+r} y (where ~ means indifference) by varying q. Results of a pilot experiment however suggested that such an elicitation technique focused the participants on probabilities only. Participants were not considering the outcomes to make their decision. They tended to use a simple heuristic consisting in assessing the midpoints of the probability interval.
2 Note that we do not mean that midpoint probabilities are some kind of normative beliefs that the participants should use. In this research, we use the midpoint probabilities as benchmarks for simplicity only. 3 We use the 1992 version of PT because it applies to risk and uncertainty, unlike the original version proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) that applies to risk only. The two versions do not differ for risk when used with binary prospects.
Estimation of the revealed beliefs
Under the PT representation, eliciting participants' revealed beliefs under S c and S i , and for each level of probability requires two steps. First, we estimate the utility function u and the individual probability weighting function w (defined under risk) by eliciting certainty equivalents of risky prospects (i.e., the sure loss z such that x p y~z). Having estimated u, we normalize it between x and y with u(x)=-1 and u(y)=0. Under PT, x [p"r,p+r] y~z is equivalent to W i ([p"r,p+r])="u(z) and x {p"r,p+r} y~z is also equivalent to W c ({p"r,p+r})="u(z). This leaves us with the decision weights capturing participants' attitude to S i and to S c .
Second, we deduce the revealed beliefs from the estimates of W i (.) and W c (.) using the following equivalence (see Wakker, 2004) :
Similarly,
Method to compute pessimism and sensitivity indices
We study the properties of revealed beliefs through a Pessimism index and a Sensitivity index. We compute these indices using a linear approximation of the functions q i and q c . A linear function is the simplest way to dissociate elevation (related to pessimism) from slope (related to likelihood sensitivity). Abdellaoui et al (2009), Kilka and Weber (2001) , and Tversky and Fox (1995) 
The coefficient b is the sensitivity index, since this slope measures the DM's sensitivity to changes in probability. The smaller b, the lower the sensitivity of the belief is. When b is equal to 1 the (revealed) beliefs are perfectly sensitive to changes in the probability level.
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The index of pessimism is defined as the average elevation (a+b/2) of the estimation.
Because the linear estimation goes from 0 to 1, the value of the estimation at p=' gives a good estimate of the elevation of the function. We can therefore determine the degree of pessimism by assessing the departure of the pessimism index, a+b/2, from the benchmark 1/2. The same indices are computed for the judged beliefs 4 .
Functional forms of the utility function and the probability weighting function
In both experiments we have used a standard nonlinear least square regression (LevendbergMarquadt algorithm) to simultaneously obtain the estimates of the parameters of the power utility function u(x)="("x/1000) ( , x$0 and of Goldstein and Einhorn's (1987) probability
Goldstein and Einhorn's specification is common in experimental studies (Lattimore et al., 1992; Tversky and Fox, 1995; Abdellaoui, 2000; Etchart-Vincent, 2004 ) because it provides a clear separation between elevation and curvature. The ) parameter mainly controls the elevation of the function and the attractiveness of the gamble. The * parameter essentially governs the curvature of the function and captures the DMs' ability to discriminate between probabilities (Gonzalez and Wu, 1999). In addition, Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000) show that two-parameter weighting functions better fit the data, even once controlled for degree of freedom
Study A: Revealed beliefs as a function of the source of uncertainty
We designed Study A to study our first research question: How do uncertainty coming from conflicting probabilistic forecasts (S c ) and uncertainty coming from consensual but imprecise probabilistic forecasts (S i ) affect DMs' beliefs and choices?
Predictions development
Our predictions derive from ambiguity -or vagueness -research (Budescu et al., 1988; Camerer and Weber, 1992; Ellsberg, 1961) . This literature shows that DMs are not indifferent between a risky prospect and a "theoretically" equivalent ambiguous prospect. In other words they are sensitive to uncertainty about probability. This literature also shows that attitude to ambiguity depends on the domain of the outcome (gain vs. loss) and the level of the probability. DMs tend to be ambiguity-seeking when facing highly probable losses and 9 highly improbable gains. They tend to be ambiguity averse when facing highly probable gains, and highly improbable losses (Hogarth and Einhorn, 1990; Tversky and Fox, 1995; Viscusi and Chesson, 1999) .
In Study A, we first predict replicating these behavioral regularities that we translate into predictions in terms of revealed belief. We predict that DMs are non-neutral to ambiguity, especially for extreme probabilities. In terms of revealed beliefs, this means that S i and S c revealed beliefs differ from midpoint probabilities especially for extreme probabilities (P1).
This is because we take Risk as the benchmark. Accordingly, non-neutrality to ambiguity means that DMs when making their choice do not use the midpoint probability that is equal to the probability of the risky prospect. Third, we also study the property of S i and S c revealed beliefs, and hence the overall attitude to S i and S c across the entire probability interval. Past experiments on sources of uncertainty have usually found that uncertainty decreases DMs' ability to distinguish between probability levels compared to risky situations (Abdellaoui et al. 2009; Kilka and Weber, 2001; Tversky and Fox, 1995) . Based on this literature, we predict that revealed beliefs under S i and S c exhibit low likelihood sensitivity (P3).
Prediction 3. S i and S c revealed beliefs exhibit low likelihood sensitivity.
Fourth, building on Bayesian reasoning (Budescu and Yu 2006, Bordley 1982) , we predict that S c revealed belief exhibit higher likelihood sensitivity than S i revealed belief. Assume for instance that two experts have observed independent cues and that their respective forecasts are p"r and p+r. If the DM's prior is 1/2, the posterior probability is (p"r)(p+r)/[(p"r)(p+r)+(1"p+r)(1"p"r)]. Therefore, the posterior probability at r is 0. It is 0.5, at 0.5 and; 1 at 1-r. In other words, the posterior probability varies more than the midpoint probability. S c revealed beliefs of Bayesian decision-makers then exhibit more likelihood sensitivity than their S i revealed beliefs. 
Certainty equivalents method
To estimate subjects' CEs for the risky/S i /S c prospects, we developed specific computerized bisection-like software. A bisection-like process is a method of elicitation that does not require the participants to state a precise value such that they would be indifferent between losing that amount for sure and playing a two-outcome negative lottery. It involves choices only, and has been found to generate more reliable data that the direct matching method (Bostic et al., 1990) . With a bisection-like process, from 3 to 7 choices between a given prospect and a sure loss are normally required to estimate the CE of a prospect. The CE of a prospect is then determined by computing the average of the highest sure loss accepted and the lowest sure loss rejected.
Our software was programmed to start each trial with a choice between a prospect and a sure loss equal to the expected value 5 of the prospect. A preference for the sure loss (resp. the prospect) generated a new question with a higher (resp. lower) sure loss. The new prospect computed by the software was the average between the highest sure loss accepted (or the worst outcome of the prospect if no sure loss had been accepted) and the lowest sure loss rejected (or the best outcome of the prospect if no sure loss had been rejected).
Participants were asked to make choices until a certainty equivalent could be estimated (using the same computation as for a new prospect) with a precision of ±1% of the difference between the two outcomes of the prospect. More information about the bisection-like process (and the stopping rule in particular) is available in the electronic supplementary material.
Reasons for eliciting CEs without real incentives
Experimenters usually implement real incentives as they ensure truthful answering and because they may have an impact on risk attitude (Weber et al., 2004) . In this research we tried to introduce real incentives, but we faced several problems. Firstly, implementing incentive compatible payment scheme in the loss domain is known to be tricky. Making the participants lose their own money is ethically questionable and in practical terms it is likely to reduce significantly the pool of voluntary participants. On the other hand, endowing the participants with a fixed amount of money that they can then lose during the experiment is not a convincing option because of the "house money" effect (Thaler and Johnson, 1990 ).
Secondly, several economists have convincingly argued that non-Expected Utility models, such as PT, are not compatible with the two most widely used incentive mechanisms, the Random Lottery Selection Procedure and Becker, DeGroot and Marchak's (1964) procedure (Holt, 1986; Karni and Safra, 1987) . Starmer and Sugden (1991) experimentally showed that the bias introduced by the Random Lottery Selection Procedure is weaker than theoretically established. They nonetheless conclude that a contamination problem might exist (p. 976).
To our knowledge, the only incentive mechanism from the literature that is compatible with PT is the "single choice for real" (Beattie and Loomes, 1997) . This procedure however, imposes a strong constraint on experiments: each participant can answer one question only.
Thirdly, the informational contexts are a key element in our experiments. We did not find a way to implement the uncertainties we needed (conflict or imprecision between experts with a similar width at various probability levels) without deceiving the subjects. For these reasons we concluded that in this research, the detriments of implementing a full incentive mechanism design might well overweight its benefits.
Protocol
The participants in this study were 61 post-graduate students (60 men, 1 woman, median age = 22) in civil engineering at Arts et Métiers ParisTech, Paris, France 6 . They were invited by email to participate in a study on decision-making, and guaranteed a !10 flat participation fee. None of them had participated in an experiment on decision-making before. The participants were asked to make a total of approximately 100 binary choices (20 series of approximately 5 binary choices), which we used to elicit their certainty equivalents of the 10 risky, 5 S i and 5 S c prospects displayed in Table 1 .
The 20 prospects were presented to the subjects in a fixed random order (see the column Rank in Table 1 ). Each type of prospect (Risk, S i and S c ) was presented with five different probability levels (0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, and 0.9). Prospect number A11 for instance was the second prospect presented to the participants. This is a S i prospect that gives !-1000 (x) with probability 0 (p-r) and 0 (y) with probability 0.2 (p+r). To check the reliability of the data, the participants were asked at the end of the questionnaire to give a second time their preferences between 6 prospects (A1, A3, A16, A18, A11 and A13) and their expected value.
6 During the experiment, the instruction and the presentation of the prospects were written in French. 
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Results
Consistency check
In this study, reliability refers to participants' consistency in their answers to the six choice questions presented twice. Table 2 gives the consistency rate for each question. It shows that the consistency rate varies between 69% and 89% depending on the question. The average consistency rate is 77.32%. This means that approximately 3/4 of the participants gave the same answer when the identical choice task was presented a second time. This rate falls between the consistency rates reported in Wakker et al. (1994) and Abdellaoui (2000) (67% with three-outcome prospects and 81% with binary prospects under risk respectively). 
Source of Uncertainty
Certainty equivalents of the prospects
As a preliminary analysis, we performed a 5 (probability level) x 3 (source of uncertainty) ANOVA for repeated measures on the mean CEs (see Table E2 in the electronic supplementary material for the descriptive statistics). The analysis reveals that the two factors and their interaction have significant effects on CEs (p=0.00 in the three cases according to F-tests 7 ). Specifically, CEs of risky prospects differ from CEs of S i prospects at 0.1 (p=0.01) and from CEs of S c prospects at 0.9 (p=0.00). In addition, S i and S c CEs differ 14 at 0.1 (p=0.00) and at 0.9 (p=0.04). The CEs analysis therefore suggests that on average participants are not neutral to uncertainty, in particular for extreme probabilities. The subsequent analysis on revealed beliefs will reveal whether these behavioral effects still hold when the curvatures of the subjects' utility and probability weighting functions are taken into account.
Risk attitude
The utility function and the probability weighting function were simultaneously elicited from Risky Prospects A1-A10 using standard nonlinear least square regression. Table 3 displays the results of the regression. Table 3 : Parameters of the utility and weighting functions (Study A)
The estimate of ( significantly exceeds 1 (t-test 8 , p=0.00), indicating concavity of the utility function. Concavity of the utility function is sometimes observed in the loss domain, at least at the individual level . The probability weighting function exhibits a small degree of elevation and the usual inverse S-shape (the estimates of ) and * are significantly lower than 1, t-test: p = 0.00 and p=0.03 respectively). More details about these results and a discussion of the concavity of the utility function are available in the electronic supplementary material.
Revealed beliefs
Having estimated the utility function and the probability weighting function, we determined the revealed beliefs using the procedure described in Section 2.2. We first predicted that S i and S c revealed beliefs differ from midpoint probabilities, especially for extreme probabilities. Confidence intervals in Table 4 support P1. Both S i and S c revealed beliefs significantly differ from midpoint probability for low (0.1) probability level. In addition, S i revealed beliefs significantly differ from midpoint probabilities for high probability (0.9) levels.
Second, we predicted that S i and S c do not generate the same revealed beliefs (P2). Results of the ANOVA support P2 because they reveal that S i and S c revealed beliefs significantly differ from each other (with p=0.00) for low probability (0.1) and high probability (0.9) levels. We now turn to the indices displayed in Table 5 to test P3 and P4. Estimates of the sensitivity indices reported in Table 5 show that S i sensitivity index is significantly smaller than 1 (p=0.00) and that S c index is significantly higher than 1 (p=0.04 pessimism index (p=0.01). Our study therefore suggests that across the probability interval in the loss domain participants prefer S c to S i . They are on average conflict lovers in the loss domain.
95% Confidence Interval
Summary of results
In Study A, we found that S i and S c revealed beliefs differ from midpoint probabilities for extreme probabilities. This finding supports P1 and is consistent with past research on attitude to ambiguity. We also found that S i revealed beliefs differ from S c revealed beliefs for extreme probabilities. A second major conclusion is therefore that revealed beliefs are influenced by the source of uncertainty (P2). Moreover, the analysis of the S i and S c sensitivity indices reveals that S i decreases DMs' ability to discriminate between probabilities, more than does S c . This finding support P4.
Study B
In Study B, we replicate Study A and we focus on the effects of S i and S c on beliefs for extreme probabilities. In addition, we address our second research question on the combination of beliefs and confidence by studying discrepancies between revealed and judged beliefs.
Predictions 1 st set of predictions: Revealed beliefs as a function of S i and S c
In this experiment, we first retest P1 and P2. We predict that S i and S c revealed beliefs differ from midpoint probabilities, especially for extreme probabilities (P1). We also predict that S i and S c revealed beliefs differ from each other especially for extreme probabilities (P2).
nd set of predictions: Likelihood sensitivity and boundary effects
We also retest P3 and we predict that S i and S c revealed beliefs exhibit low likelihood sensitivity. Moreover, we refine P4 by saying that S c extra likelihood sensitivity is due to boundaries effects. This refinement is rooted in research on aggregation of probabilities showing that advisors' degree of confidence in their advice is positively correlated with the degree of confidence DMs have in their final decision or judgment and that extreme advisors are perceived as more credible (Yates et al 1996; Keren and Teigen, 2001 ). Budescu and Yu (2007) , for instance, found that DMs' confidence in their own judgment is positively correlated with extremeness of advisors: the more extreme the advice, the more predictable the event is perceived to be. The reason for this result is that a Bayesian advisor would predict p=0 if she has absolutely no doubt. Budescu and Yu (2007) therefore suggest that extreme probability judgments, such as an advisor predicting a certain outcome (p = 1) or an impossible outcome (p = 0), generate higher degree of certainty among DMs. The extraconfidence generated by the extremeness may be observed through a bonus (a negative penalty) applied to the estimate when making a choice.
In Study B, we predict that this phenomenon is more likely to occur under S c than under S i .
The reason supporting that prediction is as follows: under S c one advisor can predict p = 0 or p = 1 when the other advisor predicts p = 0.1 or p = 0.9 respectively. Precise and extreme predictions such as "p = 0" are likely to generate a higher feeling of predictability than an This effect can be linked to Smithson's (1999) idea that uncertainty coming from conflict is more "aversive" than uncertainty coming from imprecision because conflict generates a doubt as to whether each advisor is right. In the case of extreme predictions, i.e., when two advisors disagree but one advisor predicts p = 1 (or p = 0), we predict that the negative effect of conflict would disappear because the extreme advisor is perceived as more credible. By using the degree of extremeness of the advisor as a cue to infer the degree of credibility of the advisors, DMs can solve the perceived conflict. If DMs can believe that one advisor is more credible than the other, then S c is likely to be preferred to S i (conflict preference).
rd set of predictions: Comparing revealed beliefs and judged beliefs
Several experimental studies suggest that revealed and judged beliefs are related but are not equal (Fox and Tversky, 1998; Kilka and Weber, 2001) . One reason might be that revealed belief includes both the judged belief and the confidence in this belief. When DMs give their best estimate for a risk in the format of a judged belief, they do not need to consider if they are confident or not in this estimate. On the other hand, when they have to pick a probability to make their decision (a revealed belief), they are likely to take into account the confidence they have in their forecast. If that reasoning is exact, then, we should observe that revealed beliefs differ from judged beliefs. Specifically, in the loss domain, we expect judged beliefs to exhibit less pessimism than revealed beliefs (P5). 
Experimental method Protocol
The participants were 63 (bachelor and master) students (27 women, 36 men, 40 Dutch, 23
non Dutch, median age = 20.5) at Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands. They were part of an email list of students willing to participate in studies on decision-making and guaranteed a !15 flat participation fee. The experiment was conducted in English in six sessions of 10 or 11 participants 11 .
The experiment was divided in two parts. First, the participants were asked to answer a series of binary choice questions, as in Study A. For each subject, we elicited the CEs of the 27 prospects displayed in Table 6 . The order of the prospects was randomly drawn for each participant. The participants were randomly assigned to one of the two following treatments:
%=0.01 or %=0.05. These two treatments were introduced to check the robustness of the local sensitivities (P4'). We used the CEs of prospects B16-B27 to compute the local slope of the revealed beliefs at three probability levels (0.1, 0.5, and 0.9).
In the second part of the experiment, we asked the participants to give their judged beliefs for the prospects B16-B27. We also selected randomly one prospect to check the stability of their answers. Two participants, who gave inconsistent judged beliefs, were removed from the sample. Risk 0.5 "750 "500 B14 Risk 0.5 "1000 "500 B15 Risk 0.5 "1000 "750 Table 6 : Twenty-Seven Prospects (Study B)
Material
We used the same software as in Study A and adapted it marginally to elicit the judged beliefs. To elicit judged beliefs we introduced a typical judgment task. We presented the participants with a figure displaying on the left hand side the Risky/S i /S c prospect. On the 20 right hand side, there was an input-box where participants could type their best estimate (between 0 and 1) of losing !1000. As soon as a probability was entered, a pie appeared to visually represent the probability. An example of screenshot is available in the electronic supplementary material.
We did not use any incentives mechanism for the sake of consistency with the revealed belief elicitation and because we faced the same problems as in Study A. For instance, scoring rules, such as the one used in Murphy and Winkler (1970) to ensure assessors' honesty, are incentive compatible for expected value maximizers only (Kadane and Winkler, 1988).
Results
Consistency check
In Study B we did not measure consistency by asking the participants to answer twice a series of binary choices between n prospects and their expected value. Instead, we randomly selected two prospects and asked the participants to go through the whole CE elicitation process. We can therefore check the stability of participants' responses through the repetition of two elicitations per participant. We also repeated the elicitation of one judged belief per participant.
On average, we found that the mean difference between the two CEs of the prospect selected for consistency check was !"19 (median = 0, SD = 157). This difference is not significantly different from 0 according to a t-test (p=0.18). Regarding the consistency of the judged beliefs, a paired t-test also reveals that the difference is not significant (p=0.49).
Certainty equivalents
We analyze our data using a Linear Mixed Model, a generalization of ANOVA. This method allows having several within subject variables while taking into account the repeated measure framework and allowing for some of the measures being applied to a subsample only. We performed a 9 (probability level) x 3 (source of uncertainty) x 2 (treatment) LMM with treatment (%=0.01 or %=0.05) as a between-subject factor.
The LMM analysis performed on the mean CEs reveals that the probability level only has a significant impact on the mean CEs (see Table E3 . These results show that Study B participants are on average more ambiguity neutral than Study A participants.
Risk attitude
We estimated the parameters of the utility function and the probability weighting function with the fifteen risky prospects (B1 to B15). As seen in Table 7 , the estimate of ( is significantly higher than 1, indicating that the utility function is concave. This result is consistent with Study A (a t-test correcting for unequal variance shows that the mean estimates of ( are not significantly different between the two studies, p=0.32).
1.13 (0.97) 0.49 Table 7 : Parameters of the utility and weighting functions (Study B)
As in Study A, the mean value of ) is significantly smaller than 1 (p=0.01). Its standard deviation is significantly higher than in Study A (p=0.00) but the mean values are similar across studies (between sample t-test corrected for unequal variances: p=0.48). Contrary to Study A, the mean value of the parameter * is not different from 1 (t-test: p=0.30). Study B's probability weighting function therefore does not exhibit the usual inverse-S shape.
Revealed beliefs as a function of S i and S c : Testing P1 to P2
We used the estimates of the utility function and the probability weighting function to estimate the S i and S c revealed beliefs associated to Prospects B16 to B27. Figure 3 shows that S i revealed beliefs exhibit the same pattern as in Study A. We performed a 9 (probability level) x 3 (source of uncertainty) x 2 (elicitation method) x 2 (treatment) LMM with treatment as a between subject factor. As part of the analysis, we obtained the confidence intervals and pairwise comparisons mentioned in the following paragraphs.
Recall that P1 predicts that S i and S c revealed beliefs differ from midpoint probabilities especially for extreme probabilities. As seen in Table 8 Thus, as in Study A, we found that S i revealed beliefs differ from midpoint probabilities for low and high probability levels and that S c revealed beliefs differ from midpoint probabilities for high probability levels only. These results confirm P1. To properly test our new P4' prediction on the extremeness effect of conflict, we need to analyze local sensitivities. We test whether the effects on S i and S c revealed beliefs of small changes in the forecast (of 1% or 5% 13 ) are stronger for extreme probabilities than for medium probabilities (P4'). To do so, we compare S i revealed beliefs associated with prospects B16 and B17; B18 and B19; and B20 and B21. We constructed these pairs of prospects such that the two prospects only differ by %={0.01; 0.05}. For instance, the difference of the revealed beliefs associated with Prospects B16 and B17 divided by % gave the local sensitivity at 0.1. Similarly, we study the local sensitivity of S c revealed beliefs by comparing the revealed beliefs associated with prospects B22 and B23; B24 and B25 and; B26 and B27.
Mean
As seen in Table 10 , most local sensitivity indices are not significantly different from 0 (insensitivity) and 1 (perfect sensitivity) due to high standard errors. Hence, we cannot reject insensitivity and perfect sensitivity. However, whatever %, the subjects exhibit a strong sensitivity (index higher than 1) at 0.1 under S c . This is actually where most of the strong 24 sensitivity is located. This result shows that the impacts of small changes in the forecasts are stronger for extreme probability levels than for medium probability levels. This finding supports our P4' prediction. This means that across studies we repeatedly found that S i generates a significant degree of pessimism whereas S c generates neither pessimism nor optimism (neutrality).
95% Confidence Interval
Comparing revealed beliefs and judged beliefs: Testing P5
We can now turn to the judged beliefs. LMM analysis however, reveals that the sources of uncertainty have neither a global impact on judged beliefs (p=0.20) nor a specific impact at a given probability level. More interestingly for our study, results from the LMM analysis establish a difference between judged and revealed beliefs. We found that the elicitation method (revealed vs.
Mean
judged) has a significant and uniform impact on beliefs (p=0.00). Revealed beliefs are on average higher than judged beliefs. Pooling the S i and S c decision contexts together, revealed beliefs are higher than judged beliefs at 0.1, 0.15, 0.5, 0.55. They are lower at 0.89 and 0.90.
26
This suggests that on average revealed beliefs exhibit more pessimism than judged beliefs, as predicted (P5).
To refine this result we performed a 2 (Source of Uncertainty) x 2 (Elicitation method) x 2 (Treatment) ANOVA on the S i and S c pessimism indices (see Table 12 ). This time, we found that the elicitation method has an impact on the degree of pessimism under S i (p=0.05) but does not have any impact under S c . S i revealed beliefs are significantly more pessimistic than S i judged beliefs, whereas S c revealed beliefs are not. This means that the difference between the revealed and judged beliefs mainly appears under S i .
Regarding sensitivity indices, revealed beliefs exhibit on average a smaller sensitivity than judged beliefs (p = 0.01). This difference is due to the S i decision context only (p=0.00). 
95% Confidence Interval
Summary of results
Similar to Study A, Study B confirms our P1, P2 and P4 predictions, and partially support our P3 prediction. As in Study A, Study B demonstrates that S i revealed beliefs differ from S c revealed beliefs, especially for extreme probability and; that S i decreases DMs ability to discriminate between probabilities more than S c does. Regarding the pessimism index, Study B shows that on average in the loss domain S i generates pessimism, whereas S c does not.
This finding replicates Study A's finding and indicates that DMs prefer S c to S i (conflict lovers).
In addition to replicating results from Study A, Study B showed that differences between S i and S c revealed beliefs are due to boundary effects as we found that DMs' likelihood sensitivity above all differs between S i to S c when the extreme probability 0 is involved (P4').
This might be because confidence effects are more likely to occur when advisors report forecasts that are close to impossibility (p = 0) than when they assess an intermediate 
General Conclusion
"How do the two sources of uncertainty (Si and Sc) affect DMs' choices and beliefs?"
The first result of this research is that uncertainty has an impact on DMs' beliefs and that its impact is contingent on the level of probability. Indeed, we consistently found that S i and S c revealed beliefs differ from midpoint probabilities for extreme probabilities, but not for middle probability levels. This finding is in line with studies showing DMs treat risk and ambiguity in a different manner and that attitude to ambiguity depends on the level of the probability (Camerer and Weber, 1992; Hogarth and Einhorn, 1990; Viscusi and Chesson, 1999 ).
The second noticeable finding is that for extreme events, DMs do not form their beliefs in the same way under S i and S c . We repeatedly found that S i systematically decreases DMs ability to discriminate between probabilities more than S c does. Furthermore, we also systematically found that DMs are more pessimistic under S i than under S c . This result suggests that in the loss domain, DMs are on average have a preference for conflict over imprecision. They are conflict lovers. This study hence refines Smithson (1999)'s analysis of the effect of conflict by showing that conflict and imprecision have different effects on revealed beliefs, and that these effects varies with the location of the probability.
More generally, these findings suggest that uncertainty does not correspond to a unique, homogeneous set but congregates informational contexts that are differently treated by DMs and induce different responses (Abdellaoui et al., 2009; Fox and Tversky, 1998; Kilka and Weber, 2001 ).
"Which belief do DMs base their decision on when they receive conflicting or imprecise forecasts?"
From a combination of probabilities perspective (Clemen and Winkler, 1999; Larrick and Soll, 2006) , our findings suggest two opposite perspectives on insight. On one hand, for medium probability levels, DMs' revealed beliefs are equal to midpoint probability. This suggests that they base their action on a belief that is the simple arithmetic mean of the two forecasts they received. On the other hand, DMs' revealed beliefs for extreme probability levels differ from midpoint probabilities. This means that for low and high probabilities, the simple averaging rule does not hold anymore. This result calls for new studies on 28 aggregation of beliefs that would allow the rule of aggregation to vary as a function of the level of probability so as to capture potential boundary effects.
Moreover, we also found that revealed beliefs (in particular under S i ) are on average more pessimistic than judged beliefs. This result strengthens the idea that revealed beliefs (and thus choices), contrary to judged beliefs (i.e. judgments), capture the confidence DMs have in their own beliefs. Further research based on our methodology could build on findings on the literature on aggregation of probability about confidence in one's judgment to study differences between judged beliefs and revealed beliefs more systematically. Such studies could for instance vary the width of imprecision and conflict and investigate the effects of asymmetric conflicting situations on both judged and revealed beliefs and on choices.
Theoretical implications of the results
The approach developed in this article is based on the decomposition of decision weights as proposed by Wakker (2004) . Before Wakker (2004), several authors studied the question of the decomposition of decision weight (Tversky and Fox, 1995; Weber, 1994) . Tversky and Fox (1995) for instance analyzed decision weights through their relationship with judged beliefs. These authors argued that the decision weight of an event E, denoted W(E), could be decomposed into the probability weighting function w of the PT model under risk and, the judged belief b(E), W(E)=w(b(E)). In this model, revealed beliefs, defined as q(E)=w "1 (W(E)) have no reason to differ from judged beliefs. Fox and Tversky (1998) and Kilka and Weber (2001) then suggested that the way judged beliefs are transformed into decision weights depends on the source of uncertainty, W(E)=w s (b(E)). This source-based decomposition of decision weights captures the fact that the confidence a DM has in her beliefs is uniform in one source, but can differ across sources. For instance, a DM can prefer betting on an event E1 rather than on an event E2 associated to a different source of uncertainty, even if she believes that the two events are equally likely. Mathematically, Fox and Tversky (1998)'s decomposition is equivalent to having revealed belief as a sourcedependent transformation of judged belief: q(E)=f s (b(E)) where f s =w "1 +w s with w the specific weighting function under risk. In this article, we have adopted the latter decomposition.
Our research contributes to the literature on source dependence by suggesting that DMs' revealed belief can vary within a source as a function of the level of probability because revealed beliefs captures DMs' confidence in one's judgment. In Study B for instance, 0.61} sends a signal of stronger expertise than {0.4; 0.6} does because people normally give multiples of 0.1 and 0.05 (Budescu et al., 1988; Wallsten, Budescu and Zwick, 1993) . If that is the case, then DMs' confidence in their judgment might be not constant for all elements of S c , generating the non monotonic transformation of judged beliefs into revealed beliefs.
To account for this phenomenon, an alternative decomposition of revealed beliefs could be suggested. Revealed beliefs would be a function of judged beliefs and of the confidence DMs have in their knowledge, such that q(E)=f(b(E),c(E)) where c(E) is a measure of confidence in what the DM knows about E. In terms of decision weights, we would have:
W(E)=w(b(E),c(E)) where w=w+f (w is the probability weighting function defined on objective probabilities [0, 1] ). This decomposition may also allow for better predictions of how sources of uncertainty impact on choices. It would be worthwhile to extend this research in light of this remark.
Practical implications and future research
The choice-based approach to beliefs offers several advantages, as demonstrated by the paper. It has a disadvantage however: revealed beliefs are more difficult to elicit than judged
beliefs. Yet, because our research demonstrates that revealed beliefs differ from judged beliefs, it suggests that predicting behaviors based on judged beliefs (or judged probability)
might not work well. For instance, if it happens that for medium probability events, revealed beliefs in the loss domain are more pessimistic than judged beliefs, as observed in Study B, studies on judged beliefs that do not integrate this finding will systematically predict more optimistic choices than the actual observed choices. This calls for further investigations of the discrepancies between judged beliefs and revealed beliefs, under various sources of uncertainty for extreme probabilities in the gain and the loss domains. Budescu, and R. Zwick (1993) . Comparing the calibration and coherence of numerical and verbal probability judgments. Management Science 39(2), 176-190. Weber, E.U. (1994) . From subjective probabilities to decision weights: The effect of asymmetric loss functions on the evaluation of uncertain outcomes and events. 
Psychological Bulleting
E3
To simplify the participants' task, the screenshots for risky, S i and S c decision contexts had exactly the same structure. Risky/S i /S c prospects (Option 1) were systematically displayed at the left-hand side and the sure loss (Option 2) was displayed at the right-hand side of the computer screen. Whatever the decision context, x was in purple and y in yellow. There was absolutely no time pressure; the participants were given the time they needed and were encouraged to think carefully about the questions. The software allowed the participants to modify their answers if they wish, by going backward.
Certainty equivalent method
The certainty equivalents elicited in both experiments were approximated with a precision of ±1% of the difference between the outcomes of the prospect displayed in Option 1. This was implemented as the stopping rule of the bisection process. For instance, if Option 1 involved outcomes €0 and €1000, the program stopped when the subjects had both rejected a sure loss but accepted another sure loss that was €20 lower. This bisection process thus stopped after 3 to 7 choices. Table E1 gives an example. This elicitation process prevented subject from evaluating prospects higher (lower) than their best (worst) outcomes. It also ensured that a sure loss would not be rejected when a higher one had been already accepted (by not asking such a question). It did not prevent however, all violations of stochastic dominance (i.e., participants were not prevented to assign a lower certainty equivalent to x p y than to x p' y despite p'>p). 
Question
Risk attitude at the aggregated level
In both Study A and B, the mean estimate of the parameter of the utility function is significantly greater than 1, indicating concavity of the utility function. Although in the loss domain, individuals are supposed to have convex utility functions (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) , experimental studies in the loss domain have reported mixed attitudes. Some studies have reported convex utility function at least at the individual level, while others have reported linear (Abdellaoui Bleichrodt and L'Haridon, 2008) and concave utility functions (Abdellaoui, Bleirchrodt and Paraschiv, 2007; Fennema and Van Assen, 1999; EtchartVincent, 2004 ). In our experiment, the convexity of the utility function can be due to the fact that the prospects are characterized by small amounts (between €0 and €!1000) with respect to the above-mentioned studies. For such prospects, the impact of the decreasing marginal E7 utility of money effect, which implies concavity of the utility function, is likely to be bigger than the impact of the diminishing sensitivity effect that implies convexity (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) .
In both studies, the probability weighting function exhibits a small degree of elevation. This result is consistent with several studies in the loss domain showing that participants can consider that negative risky gambles are attractive (Abdellaoui, 2000; Etchart-Vincent, 2004) .
Concerning the curvature of the probability weighting function, the probability weighting function of Study A exhibits the usual inverse S-shape whereas it is convex in Study B. This last result is still common at the individual level. Table E6 : Individual estimates of the CPT parameters and of the indices in Study B
Analysis at the individual level
